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In this  study  we  revisit the question  of whether firms' performance  (usually  measured  as 
return on assets  or ROA)  is  driven primarily by  industry- or firm-specific factors by extending past 
studies  in  two  major ways.  First,  we  examine if the  findings  of past research can be generalized 
across all firms  in  an  industry or whether it depends on a particular class of firms  within the same 
industry.  Second, in  a departure from past research,  we  use value-based measures of performance 
(economic profit or residual income and market-to-book value) instead of accounting ratios.  We also 
use a new data set and a different statistical approach for testing the significance of the independent 
effects.  Our study uncovers an  important phenomenon that may  in large part be responsible for the 
strong firm-effect  reported in  past studies.  We  show  that  a significant proportion of the  absolute 
estimates  of the  variance  of finn-specific  factors  in  our  study  is  due  to  the  presence  of a  few 
exceptional firms in an industry: the two firms that outperform their industry and the two that under-
perform in comparison to the rest.  In other words, only for a few  dominant value creators (leaders) 
and destroyers (losers) do firm-specific assets matter more than industry factors.  For most firms,  i.e. 
for those that are not notable leaders or losers in their industry,  the  industry effect turns  out to  be 
more  important  for  performance  than  firm-specific  factors.  A  possible  explanation  of  this 
phenomenon  is  that  superior  (or poor)  management leads  to  superior  (or  poor)  firm  performance 
irrespective of industry structure,  which matters only  for firms  "stuck in the middle",  i.e.  for firms 
with average managerial capabilities and performance.  We also show that this phenomenon does not 
depend on the metrics used to measure performance. 
2 INTRODUCTION 
In many industries, from wireless communications to aluminum, a few and sometimes a single firm 
often  outperform the rest. Firms in the top 20 percent of Fortune's rankings in tenns market value 
added (market value less book value of capital) enjoy double the shareholder returns of the other finns 
in their industries.1 A hundred US dollars invested in Nokia stock in 1996 was worth over $15,000 in 
1999 compared to an average of around $800 for its competitors. Over the same period, one hundred 
US dollars invested in Alcoa was worth over $400, compared to an average of approximately $150 for 
its competitors. 
Can industry factors fully explain this phenomenon? Nokia, the telecommunications firm,  is a typical 
'new economy' company, while Alcoa is a typical 'old economy' firm. It seems that while industries 
vary  in  their  environment  and  structural  characteristics,  there  are  also  significant  differences  in 
performance among finns within the same industry. This phenomenon was reported in a number of 
studies which showed that differential profit rates persist under similar external contexts (Jacobsen, 
1988). Recently, researchers in strategic management have  shown increasing interest in  the relative 
importance  of firm  and  industry  factors  for  finn  perfonnance  - as  data  availability,  statistical 
techniques  and computing power have  improved.  Past research  finds  that finn-specific  factors  are 
relatively more important than industry effects. This finding is  often generalized to  all  firms  in an 
industry. However, there is an increasing awareness among management researchers of the possibility 
that one or a few firms may dominate value creation within their industries.2 Innovative firms have 
been able to invent new markets and reinvent old ones and in this process able to capture a large part 
of the industry'S profits (Kim and Mauborgne, 1996; Gadiesh and Gilbert,  1998). The present study 
seeks to explore whether the presence of these few exceptional firms within an industry may cause the 
firm-specific effect found in past studies, a phenomenon that may not necessarily apply to  the vast 
majority offirms that make up an industry. 
I  See Jonash and Sommerlatte, (1999). 
2 For a discussion on how companies can dominate their industry's value creation, see  Kim and Mauborgne, 
(1996); Gadiesh and Gilbert, (1998); Jonash and Sommeriatte, (1999). 
3 This paper also extends past research in  a second major way by choosing market-based measures of 
performance that differ from  the  traditional  accounting  ratios used by  the  previous  studies.  If the 
purpose of firm strategy is to deliver sustainable value creation, then the performance measures used 
to study the impact of strategy have to correspondingly reflect economic performance. Past research 
on the relative  importance of firm and  industry effects  has  traditionally relied on  return on  assets 
(ROA)  as  the  performance  measure.  But accounting  measures  such  as  ROA  suffer  from  certain 
disadvantages as they can be influenced by factors that have no real effect on the economic health of 
the firm.  The more important disadvantage arises from the inability of accounting measures,  and in 
particular ROA, to conceptually reflect economic performance. 
In the current environment, characterized by the emphasis on shareholder value and economic profits, 
it is indeed a surprise that much of management research is still based on accounting-based measures 
of performance.  Recent years  have  witnessed  a rapid  adoption  of measures of economic profit or 
'residual income' in the field of corporate finance. Their appeal to  management researchers is even 
more pronounced given the pressure that financial markets have been exerting on managers to deliver 
shareholder value and the consequential orientation of firm strategies focused on this objective. 
Based on these recent developments, we use alternative measures of performance such as economic 
profit per dollar of capital employed and market-to-book value to test the effect of industry- and firm-
specific factors. We also use a new data set and implement a different statistical approach for testing 
the significance of the independent effects. 
The rest of the paper is organized as  follows.  In the next section we provide a brief review of the 
relevaut literature. In section 3 we look at the problem of industry definition and its possible impact 
on  the  research  findings.  In  section  4  we  discuss  performance  measures.  The  data  set  and 
methodology are discussed in sections 5 and 6 respectively. In section 7 we define and identify value 
leaders  and  value  losers,  and  in  sections  8  and  9  we  report  and  interpret  our empirical  results. 
Concluding remarks are found in section 10. 
4 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In  the  early  days,  studies  in  the  economics  of industrial  organization  dominated  the  strategic 
management  field.  Most  argued  that the  structural  characteristics  of particular  industries  were  a 
central  determinant  of profitability.  3  Several  studies  investigated factors  explaining the  consistent 
differences  in  performance  between industries.4  The  industrial  organization  economists'  favored 
theoretical  framework  was  the  structure-conduct-performance  (SCP)  model,  which  proposes  the 
existence of a deterministic  relationship between market structure and  profitability. The structural 
characteristics of an industry inevitably constrained the behavior (i.e. the conduct or strategies) of its 
component  firms,  which  in  tum  led to  industry-specific  performance  differentials  between  firms 
(Mason, 1939). In this framework, the industry structure in which a firm operates is the main reason 
offered to explain variations in firm profitability. Scherer (1980) points out that such a framework was 
simplistic  and  deterministic,  concluding that the  existence of interdependencies  between the three 
elements of the SCP framework was a more realistic proposition. 
An important line of research within this stream concerned the role of firm size as a factor explaining 
differences in profitability (Baumol,  1967; Hall and Weiss, 1967). Size was a source of competitive 
advantage  because  bigger  firms  are  presumed  to  be  relatively  more  efficient than  smaller  ones. 
However,  the  causal  relationships  between  size  and  profitability  have  been  widely  tested,  with 
ambiguous results.s 
In the 1980s there were major shifts in the strategic management field regarding the unit of analysis. 
While  industrial  organization  economics  considers  industry  as  the main  unit of analysis,  strategic 
management focuses  increasingly  on the  firm itself to  explain profitability differentials. The main 
reason  for  this  shift is  the  inability  of the  industrial  organization  tradition  to  provide  a rigorous 
3  Within  strategic  management,  Oster  (1990)  and  Porter  (1980)  are  major  contributors  from  industrial 
organization. 
4 For reviews, see Scherer (1980). 
5 For a review see Prescott, Kohli and Varadarajan (1986). 
5 explanation for intra-industry heterogeneity in performance. If firms within an industry faced identical 
conditions of supply and demand and operated under the same market structure, then why did some 
firms within the same industry still perform better than others? Nelson (1991) argues that traditional 
micro  economic  theory,  with  its  focus  on  industry  factors,  ignores  the  fact  that  firms  can  make 
discretionary choices and such choices are not identical across all firms within an industry. 
An important attempt to understand intra-industry heterogeneity came with the  concept of strategic 
groups that classified firms based on dimensions of competition.6 Profit differentials between groups 
were sustained due to  the  presence of conditions that created barriers to  mobility between groups. 
ASYl11Il1etries  among  firms  within  industries  act  to  limit  the  contraction  of differentials  and  the 
equalization of profit rates (Caves and Porter, 1977). 
Another significant attempt to understand intra-industry performance differences  was  the resource-
based view  of the firm,  which  proposes  that firm-specific  idiosyncrasies in  the  accumulation and 
leverage of unique and durable resources are the source of sustainable competitive advantage. Rent-
producing resources determine the profit level of firms;  for profits to  be  sustainable, the resources 
have to be scarce, difficult to copy or substitute, and difficult to trade in factor markets (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1986, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Firms were not seen as identical "black boxes" 
in a given market structure, but as dynamic collections of specific capabilities, which were the sources 
of performance differences.  Company strategies and organizational structures  differ between firms 
within  an  industry,  and  organizations  evolve  in  different  ways.  In  the  process,  the  bundle  of 
capabilities that each organization possesses comes to differ (Nelson, 1991). 
As a result, there has been much debate about the correct emphasis when analyzing a firm's strategy: 
Should strategy be examined in the context of an industry's structural characteristics, or an individual 
firm's  resources  and  capabilities?  Schmalensee's  study  (1985)  was  a  first  attempt  to  analyze 
fi  For a review  of the  strategic  group  literature,  see  McGee,  J.  and  H.  Thomas  (1986);  Thomas,  H.  and  N. 
Venkataraman (1988). 
6 empirically the contribution of industry and fInn-specifIc factors to overall profitability, taking market 
share as the measure of heterogeneity among firms, following the industrial organization assumption 
that intra-industry heterogeneity is  uniquely due to differences in finns'  size.  Using  1975 FTC LB 
data  and  return  on  assets  (ROA)  as  a  performance  measure,  the  study  reported  that  industry 
membership accounted for  around  20 percent of observed  variance  in business-unit returns  while 
market share accounted for a negligible amount. The study concluded that industry effects played a 
central role in determining profitability, while, in comparison, finn-specific factors were insignificant. 
But  Schmalensee's  1985  study  left  80  percent  of  the  total  variance  in  business-unit  returns 
unexplained. Rumelt's study (1991) attempted to clarify this large degree of error. One reason was the 
use of market-share  as  a proxy  for  firm-specific  factors,  which  probably left the  research  model 
under-specified. With a data set covering just one year, Schmalensee was constrained from specifying 
a composite firm factor that accounted for the effects of all firm-level factors.  Rumelt's  study used 
data from four years, allowing the inclusion of a composite term to measure firm effects. The study 
also extended Schmalensee's descriptive statistical model by including additional terms to measure 
the inter-temporal persistence in  industry effects, year effects,  corporate effects and effects arising 
from corporate/industry interaction.7 
Rurnelt  (1991)  reported that industry  membership explained around  9 percent of the  variance  in 
business unit returns, of which only half of this proportion was stable from year to year. Firm-specific 
effects, on the other hand, accounted for more than 44 percent of business-unit variations in profits. 
The study also reported low year effects, and negligible corporate and corporate/industry interaction 
effects. The results  were rich in  interpretation.  Not surprisingly,  the study ignited a debate on  the 
relevance of industry, firm-specific factors and diversification for profitability. 
7 Corporate effects are also known as conglomerate effects. They reflect the value added to the business due to 
its membership of  a multi-business corporation. 
7 The debate  has  been encouraged by  further empirical studies along the lines  of Rumelt's  work:  ); 
Powell,  (l996);Roquebert, Phillips  and Westfall,  (1996);  McGahan  and Porter, (1997);  Mauri  and 
Michaels, (1998 Brush, Bromiley and Hendrickx, (1999). These studies confirmed the dominance of 
firm-specific  effects.8  While  using  similar  methodology,  they  differed  from  Schmalensee  and 
Rumelt's work inasmuch as they used the Compustat database, which allowed service industries to be 
included  in  the  analysis  (the  FTC  data  set  contained  only  manufacturing  industries).9  Table  1 
summarizes the results reported in three major studies. 
With  such  robust support,  it would be safe to  conclude that industry membership does  not  matter 
much for a firm's performance. There would be little value in  another study seeking to  measure the 
impact of industry- and firm-specific effects if not for two reasons. These two issues form the key 
building blocks of this paper. First, are the results sensitive to the performance measure used or more 
importantly, is the performance measure used in past research a reliable indicator of economic value? 
Economic profits are nothing new, but somehow the research debate has been based on studies that 
have employed  accounting measures  such  as  ROA.  Second,  is  the  general  conclusion  (that  firm-
specific  effects  are  relatively  more  important  than  industry  effects)  equally  valid  for  all  firms? 
Industry and  firm effects may  vary for different classes of firms  within the same industry and this 
might arise, for instance, if the industry is made up of distinct strategic groups. Past studies argue that 
since there is  more variation in profitability within industries than between industries, firm effects 
would implicitly matter more for competitive advantage.  However,  as  pointed out earlier,  there is 
some evidence that one or a few firms often outperform the rest of the industry and this phenomenon 
could be in large part responsible for the intra-industry variations. The obvious question is whether or 
not these few firms influence the reported strong firm-specific effect and consequently whether there 
8  Other studies provide some indirect evidence on the importance  of firm  and industry effects  with  no  clear 
trend. Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1991) find  that the success of market share building strategies depends on 
the industry conditions through their analysis of the brewing industry in the US.  This study tries to proxy firm 
factors through market share and may underestimate firm effects as  seen in Schmalensee (1985). On the other 
hand,  Chatterjee  and  Wernerfelt  (1991)  find  that  the  success  of diversification  strategies  depends  on  the 
availability of surplus productive resources. 
9 Powell (1996) uses a survey methodology that uses executives' perceptions. 
8 is anything to be said about the importance of industry and firm-specific factors for the other firms in 
the same industry. 
INDUSTRY DEFINITION 
The appropriate definition of an industry is a subject of some debate in strategic management.  In the 
context of studies such as the present paper, a narrow definition would lead to a strong industry effect 
while a broad definition would demonstrate a relatively less substantial industry effect. 
Past research has classified US  industries according to the SIC system, a traditional taxonomy when 
assigning firms  to particular industry groups.  The  SIC system classifies companies  based on  their 
production  processes;  however  this  supply-side  orientation  ignores  other  dimensions  - such  as 
different customer segments on the demand side - that may be relevant to the proper classification of 
industries. As a result, the SIC system in some cases does not identify strategically relevant industries 
(McGahan  and  Porter,  1997).  Other problems  include  insufficient  classification  categories  in  the 
system. 
The fact that industry definition is  a subject of debate implies that the results  and,  importantly, the 
conclusion that firm-specific  effects  are dominant,  are  to be  interpreted with  some  caution.  If one 
cannot properly define  industries then estimates of the degree of industry  effects  on performance, 
irrespective of how it is  measured,  will not be completely reliable. However, since few  options are 
available that do not suffer from similar or other problems, researchers have to  depend on the SIC 
system for industry classification. Our research objective here is to study the firm and industry effects 
with  different data sets  and  measures, and examine the reasons  for the  strong firm-specific  effect, 
within the framework suggested by past research. 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Previous studies have used return on total assets (net income divided by total assets) as their exclusive 
performance measure. Accounting measures similar to ROA suffer from some well-known conceptual 
9 disadvantages that arise from accounting conventions. Accounting ratios do not measure cash flows, 
and returns are not adjusted for risk.  Often,  asset values are quoted at historic cost and not at their 
true replacement values.  As  a result of such conceptual shortcomings, accounting ratios could not 
provide information either on past economic profitability or on the firm's future profitability. 
Moreover, the existence of different accounting policies and conventions, and management's power to 
choose between them,  means  that accounting measures can be obtained by  alternative but equally 
acceptable  methods  in  the  legal  sense.  Some  authors  such  as  Harcourt  (1965)  and  Fisher  and 
McGowan  (1983)  argue  strongly  against  the  use  of accounting  ratios  as  proxies  for  economic 
profitability.1O It should be recoguized, however, that data on value-based measures of performance 
for a large number of companies and over a long time period were not available until recently. This 
might explain why past research has traditionally relied on accounting measures of performance. 
In this paper, we will test for two value-based measures of firm performance as  an alternative to the 
accounting-based ROA: Economic profit per dollar of capital employed and total market value per 
dollar of capital employed, where capital employed is  the sum of equity capital and debt capital. 11 
Both these measures reflect the concept of residual income, i.e.  income that is  adjusted for capital 
costs and hence risk and the  time-value of money.  These two  measures  then reflect economic, in 
contrast to accounting, performance. A second feature of these measures is that they are usually not 
bound by accounting conventions that tend to distort performance measures such as  ROA. They are 
also  adopted increasingly by  companies to  examine whether their strategies  create value for their 
shareholders. 
10 For instance, Harcourt (1965) concludes that 'the accountant's rate of profit is greatly influenced by irrelevant 
factors,  even  under  ideal  conditions'.  Similarly,  Fisher  and  McGowan  (1983)  view  that  'there  is  no  way  in 
which one can look at accounting rates of return and infer anything about relative economic profitability ... '. 
11  See for  example  Young and  O'Byrne (2001).  Others  use  different names  for  the  same  concept of residual 
income - Copeland,  Koller and Murrin (1990) call the difference between cash returns on invested capital and 
the capital charge the economic profit model. Also, see Rappaport (1986) for a similar model. The consultancy 
Stern Stewart has coined the terms Economic Value Added (EVA) and Market Value Added (MVA)  to reflect 
residual income. 
10 Economic  Profit  (EP)  is  a  version  of  the  residnal  income  method  that  measures  operating 
performance.  Unlike  traditional  accounting measures  such  as  ROA,  the  principal  feature  of this 
measure is that it reduces income by a charge for the cost of capital that is employed to produce the 
income. It is expressed as follows: 
EP = NOPAT - WACC x CE  (1) 
where NOPAT is Net Operating Profit After Tax, WACC is Weighted Average Cost of Capital and 
CE is Capital Employed. 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as, 
EP = (ROIC - WACC) x CE  (2) 
where ROIC is Return On Invested Capital (i.e. NOPAT/CE). 
Strategy is about sustainable value creation, which occurs when the firm's activities deliver a return on 
invested capital (ROIC) over time that exceeds its  weighted average cost of capital (WACC). This 
return spread (ROIC - W  ACC) measures the ability of the firm to create value per dollar of capital 
employed (CE): 
EP/CE = ROIC - WACC  (3) 
If ROIC is  greater than WACC, economic profit per dollar of capital employed is positive and the 
firm creates value. The opposite is true when ROIC is smaller than WACC. In this last equation, EP is 
scaled for size and  implicitly shows that the ability  of the firm  to  add  value,  irrespective of size, 
depends on its ability to earn a positive return spread. 
11 The second measure of value-based performance used in  this  paper is the firm's  total  market value 
(TMY)  per dollar of capital employed,  where TMV is  the  sum of the firm's  market capitalization 
(market value of equity) and the market value of its debt. This reflects the market's expectation of the 
firm's future economic profitability. To scale for size, we employ the ratio of TMV/CE. Note that the 
ratio TMV/CE is similar to Tobin's q ratio, which is expressed as the ratio of market capitalization to 
the book value of equity. The difference between Tobin's q and TMV/CE is  that the latter includes 
debt  capital  in  both  the numerator and  the denominator.  The  ratio TMV/CE also  reflects  residual 
performance in  market terms and indicates how much the firm has been able to create value on the 
capital invested by shareholders and debtholders. If a firm's TMV/CE is greater than  1, then the firm 
increased the value of capital invested in the firm while the opposite is true if the value of TMY  ICE is 
less than 1. 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
The source of data on EP and TMV are the data sets provided by the consultancy Stem Stewart. It 
makes  adjustments to account for both capital costs and  accounting conventions in  calculating EP 
(otherwise known as EVA) and TMV (otherwise known as MY  A).12 Stewart (1991), Martin and Petty 
(2000) and Young and Q'Byme (2001) provides an overview of common adjustments that are made 
to financial statements to calculate these measures. Some common adjustments involve corrections for 
distortions caused by accounting policies that can understate the true level of invested capital (also 
referred as  a correction for successful efforts accounting) and for those caused by the accounting for 
operating leases,  mergers,  goodwill,  marketing expenses,  and  research  and development expenses. 
EVA consultants have identified over 150 possible adjustments but most companies that adopt EVA 
restrict the number of adjustments to fewer than ten to make performance systems manageable. 
The Stem Stewart data set ranks firms based on their annual MV  A performance for firms in the US 
and several European countries and these rankings are published yearly in Fortune and  in  business 
12 journals in Europe and Asia. In addition, the data is also published each year in the Journal of  Applied 
Corporate Finance.  While these data sets have been used in  empirical research in the finance  and 
accounting fields,!] they have yet to find serious attention in strategic management research. In recent 
years, several companies have applied these metrics to measure performance both in the US  and in 
other countries (Martin and Petty, 2000). 
The US data set covers 1,000 listed companies for periods of up to 21  years. The firms are classified 
into  industries  following  the  SIC  system  at  the  3-digit  level,  and  the  data  retains  many  of the 
advantages of the Compustat data set (see Roquebert et al., 1996). It is recent, covers a relatively long 
period of timel4 aiid has a broad range of industries in both manufacturing and services. 
One feature of the data set, however, is that it contains only the 1,000 best-performing companies and 
tends to be dominated by large companies. To a certain extent, this inherent size bias gets accounted 
for as we scale values of EP and TMV (such as in equation 3).15 A second bias is the survivor bias that 
is inherent in this as  well as past studies. The data set only contains firms that survived during the 
time period. However, the assumption of random industries within the economy, and random firms 
within the industries,  means that the results,  in principle, could be generalized if the  effects  were 
found to be significant. 
A third aspect of the data set is that it does not provide business-level data at the four digit SIC code 
level, and provides performance data essentially for the primary business of the company. Balancing 
the advantages of measure validity of the data set against the disadvantages of corporate data,  we 
proceed with the  empirical  analysis  for  the following  reasons.  Firstly,  one  well-known  study  by 
12  Stern Stewart measures market-based residual performance with Market Value Added (MVA) which is  the 
difference between TMV and CE, i.e. MVA = TMV - CEo  By dividing both sides of this equation by CE and 
rearranging the terms we have the expression TMV  ICE =  (MV  NCE) + 1. 
13  For instance, see Martin and Petty (2000). 
14  In comparison, Schmalensee'  s study was based on a single year of data,  whereas Rumelt's was based on 4 
years of data. Other recent studies have had more longer data periods, such as Roquebert et al. (1996) - 7 years, 
Brush et al. (1999) - \0 years, McGahan and Porter (1997) - 14 years. 
15  Since there are  no  a  priori  criteria in  the  selection of industries  and  years,  sampling  assumptions  about 
industry and year are that they are random selections from their respective underlying popUlations. 
13 Wemerfelt and Montgomery  (1988)  uses  a similar approach  in  studying corporate diversification, 
where  specificity  is  sacrificed  for  the  sake  of better  value  measures.  Secondly,  our  interest  is 
particularly in the relative importance of industry versus firm-specific effects, and any corporate level 
effect will add on to the firm-effect variable. In the next section on the empirical model, we discuss 
the corporate effect in more detail. 16 
The sample set covers the 10-year period from 1987 to 1996, representing a full economic cycle in the 
US:  growth in the late 1980s followed by recession in the early  1990s and growth again in the later 
1990s. The sample was screened in various  ways.  We dropped firms  that did not contain a primary 
SIC designation, or were identified by  SIC as  'not elsewhere classified'. Firms that reported results 
with missing values were also discarded.  The data was also screened to identify firms that were not 
reported to be active in the same industry classification over the 10-year period. We also discarded 
firms that did not have a primary industry classification because they were conglomerates. The final 
sample contains 5,620 observations for 562 firms across 55 industry classifications with an average of 
over  10  firms  per industry.  Table 2  shows  the  number of firms  in  each  industry  on  each  of the 
performance measures used. Additional statistics describing the sample are reported in Table 3. 
In  addition, we also test the sample using ROA,  so as  to enable comparisons with previous studies. 
We use the Compustat database for data on ROA for the firms  included in the EP/CE and TMV/CE 
sample. 
Table  4  shows  the  correlation  coefficients  between  EP/CE,  TMV/CE  and  ROA.  The  correlation 
between the two measures of operating performance (EP/CE and ROA) is, on average, relatively high 
(0.80) while that between the measures of operating performance and market value is also strong on 
average  (0.53).  Whether  this  could  mean  that  the  level  and  the  relative  importance  of firm  and 
16 We also examine how much the results obtained by using this data are in line with those obtained by past studies. 
14 industry effects would be  similar across the  three measures is  one subject of investigation for this 
paper.  17 
MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
The model we use to examine the effects of industry, firm-specific and year factors largely follows the 
descriptive model used in  past research (Schmalensee,  1985;  Rumelt,  1991;  McGahan  and  Porter, 
1997). We have taken the  variance components  procedure used  in past research  as  our statistical 
methodology. This methodology estimates the proportions explained by each independent variable in 
the variation of the dependent variable (performance measure). However, we use a different approach 
for testing the significance of the independent effects. 
Our analysis is based on the following descriptive model, which is similar to Schmalensee (1985) and 
Rumelt (1991). 
rijt = ft  ... + ai + f3j +  Yt + (aY)it + f:ijt  (4) 
where fl ...  is a constant equal to the overall mean (the three dots indicate that it is an average over the 
i, j  and t index); ai is a random industry effect where i = 1  ...  r denotes anyone industry as i;  f3j  is a 
random firm effect where j = 1  ...  n; denotes anyone firm as j; ni is the number of firms within industry 
i where i denotes anyone industry as i; y, is a random year effects where t denotes anyone year as t; 
(ay);/8 is a random industry-year interaction effects; and Eij' is a random error term. 
The main effects (ex;,  f3j  and y,)  and the interaction effect (aY)it follow a normal random distribution 
with mean zero and variance  cr2 a,  cr2~, cr\ and cr2 ay,  i.e. E (0,  cr2 ).  The random independent effects 
specified in the above model are generated by random processes that are independent of each other, 
17 In our view, despite a high correlation, the important point is that measures reflecting economic performance 
and  shareholder  value  creation  should  be  used  for  research  studies  examining  performance.  The  measures' 
conceptual appeal and  as well as their increasing acceptance by firms  to  make their strategic decisions perhaps 
should take precedence over the extent of correlation with accounting measures. 
15 i.e. each of the main effects is an independent random solution from an underlying population that is 
normally-distributed. 
The model specifies for five  sources of variation in business returns:  stable and  transient industry 
factors,  stable firm-specific effects, the effects  of yearly  macroeconomic  fluctuations,  and random 
error. Firm effects comprise all firm-specific factors such as heterogeneity among firms in tangible 
and  intangible  assets  due  to  differences  in  reputation,  operational  effectiveness,  organizational 
processes  and  managerial  skills.  Stable  industry  effects  reflect  the  influence  of  structural 
characteristics of industries on the performance of firms  while the transient component of industry 
effects measures the sensitivity of profitability to the impact of business cycles on the industry. The 
impact of  factors with broader economic significance is captured by the year effect. 
The differences between our model and those of Rurnelt (1991)  and others are  that the notion of 
'corporate effect' has been discarded. Schmalensee (1985), Rumelt (1991) and McGahan and Porter 
(1997)  all reported low corporate effects, hence we assume that the exclusion of corporate effects 
would not have  a  significant  impact  the  model's  specification.  Some  recent  studies  report  non-
negligible corporate effects (Roquebert et al (1996), Brush and Bromiley (1997)). However, there is 
some  debate  as  to  the  size  and  the  significance  of the  corporate  effects.  From  an  empirical 
perspective,  some  of  the  studies  that  show  a  non-negligible  corporate  effect  are  not  directly 
comparable due to differences in data sets (Rumelt uses the FTC data base while Roquebert et al, 
1996 and Brush and Bromiley, 1997 use Compustat) as well as differences in methodology (variance 
components versus regression). Roquebert et al.  (1996) use a similar data set and methodology as 
McGahan and  Porter  (1997)  but report  a  much  higher corporate  effect  (17.9%  versus  4.3%  for 
McGahan and Porter). A key factor is the difference in samples between the studies - Roquebert et al. 
18 (a:Y)it is not a product of two variables, (l and y. It  simply indicates the interaction between two main effects (l 
andy. 
16 (1996) exclude single business firms from their sample, which is likely to lead to higher corporate 
results.19 
In discarding the corporate effects, we are motivated by three issues. Firstly, evidence from studies on 
corporate diversification and refocusing suggest that the value added by corporate management has 
been  often  questionable  and  even  negative  (frequently  referred  to  as  the conglomerate discount) 
according to  many  studies  both  in  strategy  and finance  (Markides,  1993;  Goold,  Campbell  and 
Alexander,  1994; Lang and Stulz,  1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995). Past studies that tend to justify a 
corporate effect imply that there is only a positive value added by corporate management. But since 
management practice indicates that there is often a negative role played by corporate strategies, and as 
variance-based procedures cannot identify negative effects, the present study's model will exclude 
corporate effects. Secondly, we follow Wemerfelt and Montgomery's (1988) approach: when using 
Tobin's q as a performance measure, specificity is sacrificed for the sake of better value measures. 
Finally, our interest is particularly in the relative importance of industry versus firm-specific effects 
and not in general corporate effects. In our model specification, any corporate effect is likely to show 
up in the firm effect.20 
Past  studies  use  two  methods  to  estimate  the  variances:  analysis  of  variance  and  variance 
components.21  The analysis of variance is a hierarchical procedure, where the researcher begins by 
estimating a null regression model with no independent effects, with the dependent variable a function 
19  In a recent study, Bowman and  Helfat (2001) also suggest discarding single-business firms.  However,  this 
approach is likely to lead to overestimation of corporate effects and would not say if the businesses within the 
corporation would have performed better as single business or whether the multi-business structure is adding to 
the competitive advantage of the business. The exclusion of single business firms will also bias industry effects 
and finally, the results will not be applicable to the economy as a whole. 
20 The inclusion of corporate effect poses other empirical problems. For instance, McGahan and Porter (1997) 
and  Roquebert et al.  (1996)  provide  evidence that the  corporate effect decreases  as  the average  number of 
businesses within the multi-business corporation increases. This implies that in companies that diversify beyond 
what is justified by their core capabilities, corporate management has less and less value to add. To account for 
this,  corporate effects  have to  be  controlled for  relatedness  among  business,  which  poses  research  problems 
(under the current research design) that are not readily overcome. 
21  As is generally with variance procedures, both these methods are based on averages - averages of returns to 
firms, industries and years. These independent variable averages are first subtracted from the overall mean, then 
this  difference is  summed across the levels of the  variable,  which is  then finally multiplied  with appropriate 
weights (see Searle, 1971). 
17 of only a constant (typically, the mean of all observations). Adding the independent effects one after 
another then expands this initial null model and the researcher tests the parsimony of the expanding 
model by calculating the increment to the adjusted R2 of the regression as an indicator of the fraction 
of the  variance  explained  by  each  independent  variable.  By  design,  the  order  of entry  of the 
independent variable  can  have  large impact  on  which  variable explains the  most  variance  in the 
dependent variable. Typically, the first entries explain a large proportion of the variance, while the 
later  variables  explain progressively  less  variance.  This  is  generally  the  fixed-effects  version  of 
analysis  of variance.  The  other  popular method  is  the  variance  components  procedure,  which  is 
sometimes  termed  as  random-effects  analysis  of variance.22  In this  study,  we  use  the  variance 
components procedure used here is similar to the one employed in past research.23  The equation for 
the  estimation of variance  components  is  developed  based  on  the descriptive  statistical  model  of 
equation (4), by decomposing the total variance in the dependent variable (profitability measure) into 
its components as follows: 
(5) 
The  dependent variable  rijl  in  the  above  model  has  constant  variance  and is  normally  distributed 
because  they  are  linear  combinations  of  independent  normal  random  variables.  We  use  the 
V  ARCOMP procedure in SAS software to estimate the different variance components. The variance 
components estimation is  particularly suited to studies  such as  the present paper since it does not 
require a data set covering the whole population, while at the same time allowing the results to be 
generalized. This is useful since it is impossible to construct a data set that covers all industries and all 
firms in each industry. 
One  inherent disadvantage  of the  variance  components  estimation  is  that  the procedure  does  not 
provide reliable tests for the significance of the independent effects. Since the independent effects are 
22 Variance component models are a special type of ANOVA models - the random effects ANOVA where the 
independent  variables  are  assumed  to  be  random  in  nature.  See Neter,  Kutner,  Nachtsheim  and  Wasserman 
(1996), Chapter 24. 
18 assumed to be generated by an independent random draw from an underlying population of the class 
of the effects, the null hypothesis that some of the variance parameters are zero lies on the boundary 
of the parameter space. This characteristic presents a non-standard problem for producing significance 
statistics.z4  Roquebert  et al.  (1996)  produce  the  standard errors  along with  variance components 
estimates.  While  acknowledging  the  limitations,  they  argue  that  the  magnitude  of the  parameter, 
expressed as a percentage of the total variance explained, can be used as an indicator of the likelihood 
that the underlying value of the parameter is nonzero. 
Schmalensee (1985),  Rumelt (1991)  and  McGahan and Porter (1997)  solve this  situation by using 
nested ANOV  A techniques that consider the effects to be fixed.  The ANOV  A approach generates F-
statistics for the presence of the independent effects. While the fixed effects transformation resolves 
the  significance  testing  problem  of the  variance  components  procedure,  it  restricts  the  critical 
assumption of randonmess of the independent effects. An important characteristic of the assumption 
of randonmess  is  that  results  regarding  both  the  presence  and  the  importance  of  the  various 
independent effects can be generalized over the population as a whole. In choosing the fixed effects 
ANOVA  approach for significance testing, Schmalensee (1985),  Rumelt (1991)  and McGahan and 
Porter (1997) argue that an ANOV  A test for significance is not a pre-requisite to variance components 
estimation, since their main interest lies in estimating the relative magnitudes of the different effects, 
and significance results are only of secondary importance. 
We approach this problem by using a random effects ANOVA model. The random effects ANOVA 
model  assumes  that  all  the  independent  effects  specified  in  the  model  are  generated  by  random 
processes, consistent with the variance components assumptions. The random ANOV A model departs 
from its fixed effect version only in the expected mean squares and the consequent test statistic. Since 
23  In SAS packages, it is possible to control the biases that arise from the order of entry of independent effects 
by rotating the entry and adjusting the estimate ofthe variances. 
24  The MIXED procedure  in  SAS  can  also  be  used  to  specify  a pure  random  effects  model.  The MIXED 
procedure can generate Wald Z-test of significance statistics, but their usefulness is  doubtful due to  the non-
standard  nature  of testing  for  significance  of random  effects.  See  Verbeke  and  Molenberghs  (1997)  for  a 
discussion on the issue of testing for significance in random effects models. 
19 this  procedure has not been employed in the past research,  we  provide a simple illustration  of the 
design of such models and the calculation of F-statistics. 
Let us assume that our model consists of two exogenous factors A (say, industry) and B (say, year). In 
a  random-effects  version  of ANOV  A  for  a two-factor  study,  we  assume  that  both  factor-A  main 
effects ai,  and factor-B main effects  ~j, are independent random variables. Further, we assume that the 
interaction effects  (a~)ij are independent random variables. The random-effects version of ANOV  A 
for a two-factor study with equal sample sizes n is: 
Y ij =  f,l  .. + ai +!3j +(a!3h + Eij,  (6) 
where fl is a constant (the two dots indicate that it is an average over the i and j index); ai,  ~j,  (a~)ij 
are independent random variables with expectations zero and variances a2 ",  a2~, a2,,~; i equals  1,  ,  .. , 
a;j=I, ...  ,b. 
Such  a two-factor random model  differs  from  its  fixed-version  counterpart in  the  expected  mean 
squares. These expected mean squares are shown in Table 5 where the expressions for the expected 
mean squares can be derived using the usual expectation theorems (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim and 
Wasserman (1996)). 
To test, for instance, for the presence of factor A effects in the random ANOV  A model, we make the 
following hypothesis: 
If we examine the expressions for MSA and MSAB, we see that if a2"  equals zero, then MSA equals 
MSAB.  This means that MSA will be greater than MSAB, if and only if factor-A effects are present. 
We use this characteristic to generate a test statistic. 
20 F* =  MSA / MSAB 
By  using the  usual  significance  levels,  one  can  detennine  whether  the  result  provided  by  F*  is 
statistically significant.  The difference between the above illustration and  the present study is that 
there is  a third factor (finn)  which is  nested within  another factor  (industry).  However,  the  basic 
intuition remains the same in testing for the presence of the different effects. 
VALUE LEADERS, LOSERS AND AVERAGE PERFORMERS 
In many industries, it has been observed that a few finns tend to outperfonn the rest.  Canon's market 
capitalization in the period  1996-1999 increased by  a factor of over 2.5  while the  increase for its 
competitors is around 1.7.  During the same period, Chrysler increased its market capitalization more 
than tenfold, compared to  a doubling (on average) for other automobile manufacturers.25  When we 
look at our data set, we observe a similar trend.  In industries such as discount retailing, software and 
beverages,  one finn's perfonnance (respectively, Wal-Mart,  Microsoft and Coke)  substantially and 
persistently differs from that of the others in its industry.  26 
It has also been observed that industries feature 'abnonnal' value losers as  well as value leaders. In 
tenns of shareholder value, finns in the bottom 20 percent report returns that amount to less than one 
third of those gleaned by  their average competitors (Jonash  and Sommerlatte,  1999). If sustainable 
competitive advantage is taken as the basis for sustained superior perfonnance then, by analogy, finns 
at the bottom of the industry are at a significant competitive disadvantage. The few finns that deviate 
strongly from the rest of their industry could influence the general result, which itself mayor may not 
apply to the rest of the industry. Finn-specific factors drive superior or inferior performance (relative 
to the industry) but this does not help detennine the perfonnance drivers offinns that are 'stuck in the 
middle'.  In  other words,  we  are  interested  in  two  issues.  Does  the  perfonnance  of a  few  finns 
25 See Jonash and Sommerlatte, 1999. 
26 It is possible that these value leaders also have  high market shares  in  their respective industries.  This raises 
the question whether high market shares are necessary for high value creation. Research shows that it is difficult 
to make unambiguous conclusions about the nature of this  relationship (see Prescott et ai.,  1986; Schwalbach, 
1991). 
21 influence  the relative  importance  of firm-specific  and  industry  effects? And  what  is  the relative 
magnitude of these effects for firms that are 'stuck in the middle'? 
We make a rough attempt to  identify an industry's value leaders and losers. Exact definitions  of a 
value leader or loser are debatable, but our purpose here is to give some preliminary attention to the 
influence of such  'outliers'  on firm-specific  and industry  effects,  and to  the  importance  of  these 
effects on firms in the middle. The following procedure is used to identify value leaders and losers in 
an industry. To be identified as a value leader in its industry a firm must meet two criteria. First, its 
performance must be the highest in its industry for the maximum number of years within its industry. 
Second, the firm must have the biggest cumulative value over the ten-year period. The second criteria 
resolves  situations  when  there  is  more than  one firm has  outperformed the industry for an  equal 
number of years that is the highest. The same logic is applied to the identification of an industry's 
value loser. A firm with the consistently worst performance vis-a-vis the industry average, i.e. for at 
the maximum number of years which also has the lowest cumulative value over the same period is 
identified as  an  industry's value loser. We apply the descriptive statistical model (equation (4» and 
the varcomp procedure firstly to the full sample that includes all the firms, and secondly to a reduced 
sample  that excludes  the top  two  value  leaders  and bottom  two  value losers  in the industry.  The 
reduced sample contains 3420 observations for 342 firms across the 55 industry classifications. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Prior to examining the impact of leading and losing firms on the level of firm and industry effects, we 
first test whether the magnitude of firm and industry effects are sensitive to the performance measure. 
Table 6  gives  the variance components estimates  of the  independent variables  that add up  to the 
variation in the dependent variable (EY  AlCE, TMV/CE and ROA). Table 7 gives the percentages of 
the total variance of the dependent variable explained by  the independent effects of the model. All 
estimates  were  evaluated  at  5  percent  level  by  the  random  ANOY  A  procedure  for  statistical 
significance. 
22 From the  results,  it is  evident  that  firm  effects  dominate  long-term  performance  irrespective  of 
whether  performance  is  measured  by  EP/CE,  TMV/CE  or  ROA.  Stable  firm  effects  explain 
considerably more variance in the dependent variable than total industry effects, which are the sum of 
the stable and transient components. Total industry effects for EP/CE, TMV/CE and ROA are  10.7 
percent, 14.3 percent and 11.2 percent, respectively (the sum of industry and industry-year effects in 
Table 7). In comparison,  the  corresponding figures  for  stable  firm  effects  are  27.1  percent,  32.5 
percent and 35.8 percent. 
The dominance  of firm-specific  effects  is  even  more  pronounced  when  we  compare  stable  firm-
specific effects  with  stable  industry  effects. In the  case of EP/CE  and  ROA,  stable firm-specific 
effects dominate stable industry effects by a factor of more than four,  while in the case of TMVlCE 
the amount of variance explained by stable firm effects is approximately three times more than that of 
stable industry effects. Year effects are smaller than firm-specific and industry effects, ranging from 
1.0  percent for  ROA  to  1.9  percent  for  EP/CE.  Table  8  contains  the  comparable  figures  from 
Schmalensee (1985), Rumelt (1991) and McGahan and Porter (1997) on the various effects. 
The present paper's use of alternative measures of performance and a different data set does not alter 
the principal conclusion of recent studies,  i.e. firm-specific effects dominate industry effects  when 
seeking to explain performance. Furthermore, the random effects ANOV  A approach indicates that the 
hypothesized independent effects are significant - the same conclusion was reached by past studies 
using the fixed-effects ANOV  A approach. 
One reason for the consistency of the results across the three measures could be that, in large cross-
sectional  and  longitudinal  studies  of  the  present  type,  discrepancies  resulting  from  different 
accounting measurements might even out over a period of time (Kay, 1976).27 A second reason could 
be that while the results are  similar, the processes that lead to  the results  might vary.  The results 
27  'The accountant's rate of profit, measured over a period of years, will be an acceptable indicator of the true 
rate of  return: it is over a single year that it may prove seriously misleading' (Kay, 1976). 
23 indicate  only  that finn-level  factors  are  relatively  more  important  across  the  three  performance 
measures. We cannot say what these finn-level factors are, or whether the finn-level factors that drive 
performance in tenns of ROA, EP/CE and TMV/CE are the same. 
Even  though  the  current  sample  is  smaller  than  some  of those  employed  in  similar comparative 
studies, it is  nevertheless homogeneous  in  terms  of firm size,  it  has  estimates that are  statistically 
significant, and its results are in line with those reported in past studies. However, these results apply 
to all finns within the industry in the same way as  the results of past research. Given the increasing 
awareness that a few firms in many industries dominate the industry's value pie, in the next section 
we examine the impact of outlying firms have on the firm and industry effects (see previous section 
for identification of value leaders and value losers). 
VALUE LEADERS AND LOSERS AND THE INDUSTRY EFFECT 
We now examine the impact of value 'leaders' and 'losers' on the levels of finn and industry effects. 
The modified sample, which excludes the two  industry leaders and losers, is subjected to the same 
variance components estimation model and procedure as the full sample that we analyzed earlier. The 
independent effects are tested for statistical significance at the 5 percent level through the random 
ANOV  A procedure. 
Table 9 reports the estimated variance-covariance components for the modified sample and Table 10 
shows the proportion of variance in performance explained by firm, industry and year effects, as well 
as by the effects of industry/year interaction. 
The results shown in Tables 9 and 10 provide evidence on the impact of the outliers on the level of 
finn effect. In terms of variance component estimates, the finn factor contributes less across all three 
measures  of perfonnance,  while  industry  factors  increase  for  ROA  and  TMV  ICE,  and  remaining 
almost  the same  for  EP/CE.  Table  10  indicates  that in  terms  of relative  proportions  of variation 
explained industry factors are more important than firm-level factors in explaining firm performance. 
24 When performance is measured with TMVICE,  overall industry effects (the sum of  stable and transient 
industry effects)  explain  35.2 percent in  variation  compared to  only 17.0 percent for firm-specific 
effects.  In  the  case  of EPICE  it  is 18.2 percent for  industry effects versus  17.6 percent for firm-
specific effects and for ROA it is 20.1 percent against 16.7 percent.  In  general, for a majority of  the 
industry's  firms,  industry  effects  seem  to  dominate  firm  effects  in  explaining  the  variation  in 
performance. 
The findings indicate that a significant proportion of the absolute estimates of the variance of firm-
specific factors in our study is due to the presence of a few firms  that consistently deviate from the 
rest of their industry. The implication is  that for  value leaders and losers, finn factors  matter more 
than  industry  effects.  In  other  words,  only  for  the  few  dominant  value  creatorslleaders  and 
destroyers/losers do  firm-specific  assets  matter more than industry factors.  To the vast  majority  of 
firms, i.e. for firms that are neither industry leaders nor losers, the industry effect turns out to be more 
important for performance than firm-specific factors. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is 
that  superior (or poor)  management  leads  to  superior  (or  poor)  firm  performance  irrespective  of 
industry  structure,  which matters  only for firms  'stuck in the  middle', i.e.  for  firms  with  average 
managerial capabilities and performance. 
We mentioned earlier that this study makes only a rough attempt to examine whether firm factors are 
equally important for all firms, and whether industry effects really matter to  firms  that are  'stuck in 
the middle', i.e. firms that do not possess unique competencies that can be leveraged successfully in 
product  market  competition.  Our  approach,  discarding  only  the  two  best- and  the  two  worst-
performing firms per industry, provides a rather extreme test of our proposition. Had we decided to 
discard, say, the top and bottom quartile of each industry in terms of performance, the results would 
have been even more pronounced. 
25 OUTLYING INDUSTRIES AND THE INDUSTRY EFFECT 
One related question  is  the  impact  of outlying industries  on  both  firm  and  industry effects.  Some 
readers may be worried that while we discard outperforming firms, we do not do conduct tests with 
outlying industries. A key empirical basis for the high firm effects observed in the previous studies is 
that  intra-industry  variance  in  performance  was  observed  to  be  greater  than  the  inter-industry 
performance variance (Stigler, 1963; Fisher and Hall, 1969). This study builds on this empirical basis 
by arguing that most of the intra-industry variance may be due to the performance of a few firms. The 
implication  of high  intra-industry  dispersion  in  performance  means  that  removing  some  outlying 
industries  should  not  imply  a  significant  change  in  the  level  of  firm  and  industry  effects. 
Conceptually,  if firm's  can  influence  industry  structure  (Kim  and  Mauborgne,  1996),  and  the 
difference  between  value  leaders  and  the  rest  is  pervasive  across  the  economy,  then  removing 
relatively  attractive  and unattractive  industries  and  re-estimating firm  and  industry  effects  do  not 
make sense. We test whether this is indeed the case and if removing outlying firms has a substantial 
effect on the previously estimated impacts of firm and industry factors. 
In  the  identification  of industry  outliers,  we  first  measure  industry  performance  as  the  average 
performance of the firms in the industry in a year. Outlying industries are identified based on similar 
criteria as  those applied with outlying firms in the paper. The tests were run by removing initially 3 
from the top and 3 from the bottom (approximately 11 % of the number of industries), which was later 
increased it to 4 and then 5 in both top and bottom (approximately 19% of the number of industries). 
The results, exhibited in tables  11,  12 and  13,  indicate that the  relative levels of industry and firm 
effects remain stable and independent of the number of outlying industries removed. The variance in 
performance among firms and industries is still driven by the intra-industry component than the inter-
industry component. In the view of the present study, even if we remove the outlying industries, value 
leaders in the remaining industries in the sample influence firm effects. 
26 The results suggest once again that we have to think in terms of outperforming and under-performing 
firms rather than attractive and unattractive industries. ill this view, whether an industry is  attractive 
or not depends on the firm's resources and competencies that embody its competitive advantage and 
sustain its performance difference over its rivals. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A major objective of this study was to examine whether a few firms may in fact drive the strong firm-
specific effects reported in earlier studies. ill corollary, we also examined the impact of firm-specific 
and industry factors on those firms that do not outperform or under-perform in relation to the rest of 
their industry. Our objective was to provide a first indication on the impact of outliers on the relative 
importance of industry and firm effects. The results  suggest that industry-specific factors  may  have 
different meaning for different types of firms within an industry. Industry factors may  have a large 
impact on the performance of the 'also-ran' firms,  while for the industry leaders and losers that firm-
factors dominate. This result is robust across all the three measures of performance used in this study. 
However, we could argue that even if industry factors  are not statistically important for leaders and 
losers, it is unlikely that these firms  could ignore their industry's economics.  illdeed, value leaders 
tend to build their success on  their deep understanding of their industry, and use this knowledge to 
create and capture most of the industry value. 
We would note here the relatively large amount of error reported in the present research as well as in 
past  studies  (from 45  percent  (Rumelt,  1991)  to  80  percent  (Schmalensee,  1985).  Firm-specific 
effects only dominate the explained variations in performance. In fact, a significant proportion of the 
performance variations observed is due to as yet completely unexplained factors. Here, we risk some 
speculation  as  to  the  additional effects  that could be  included in  the  model in order to  add  to  its 
explanatory  power.  We  consider  in  particular  two  additional  concepts,  namely  the  firm/year 
interaction effect and  the industry/firm interaction effect.  Rumelt suggests  that some  of the error 
might reflect the transient effects of firm-level factors.  Even though this can be easily modeled, the 
27 calculation seems difficult because of computing power limitations, even with  current standards of 
computing  power.  The  industry/firm  interaction  is  more  interesting,  however.  It  reflects  the 
importance of the interdependency between firm capabilities and the industry environment. However, 
with the current model we cannot estimate this interaction because the firm factor is nested within the 
industry.  Interaction between  a main factor (i.e.  industry) and  a factor nested within  it cannot be 
estimated. 
Our study is no exception and it contains some potential problems. Since the results are based on  a 
sample that was taken from a data set containing the 1,000 largest and publicly-listed firms, we should 
be cautious when seeking to generalize the results.  We address the problem by scaling the variables 
for size and assuming the randomness of industries and firms. To improve generalization, such studies 
could  be replicated  for  other  countries,  wherever  large  longitudinal  and  cross-sectional  data  are 
available.  This could reveal country effects that drive performance, and might allow for the testing of 
assertions  regarding  the  competitive  advantage  of  nations.  The  study  implies  that  significant 
performance  difference  persist  between  different  classes  of firms  in  the  same  industry.  Further 
research is justified into whether this also implies the presence of strategic groups composed of such 
firms.  The question of exactly what constitutes industry- and  firm-level  factors  also  merits  further 
investigation. 
28 Table 1 
Firm, industry and other effects on performance identified in past research 
Percentage of variance explained of the dependent variable (ROA) 
Schmalensee  Rumelt* (1991)  McGahan and 
(1985)  Sample A  SampleB  Porter (1997) 
Firm Effects  0.6%  46.4 %  44.2%  31.7 % 
Industry Effects  19.6 %  8.3 %  4.0%  18.7 % 
Year Effects  N/A  N/A  N/A  2.4 % 
Industry  /Y  ear Effects  N/A  7.8 %  5.4 %  N/A 
Corporate Effects  N/A  0.8 %  1.6 %  4.3% 
Error  80.4 %  36.9 %  44.8 %  48.4 % 
*Rumelt uses two samples,  naming them Sample A and  Sample B.  Sample A is  similar to  Schmalensee and 
Sample B covers a larger set of firms than sample A. 
Table 4 
Correlation between EP/CE, TMV/CE and ROA 
(EP = Economic Profit; CE = Capital Employed; TMV = Total Market Value - See section 4) 
EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
EP/CE  1.00  0.57  0.80 
TMV/CE  1.00  0.48 
ROA  1.00 
Table 5 
Expected mean squares for two-factor ANOVA models 
Mean Square  Degrees of Freedom  Expected Mean Squares 
MSA  a-I  cr/ + nbcr2  a + ncr2  a~ 
MSB  b-l  cre2+  nacr2~ + ncr2a~ 
MSAB  (a-1)(b-l)  cre2+  n~a~ 
MSE  (n-1)ab  cre2 
29 Table 2 
Number of firms by industry and performance measure 
(EP =  Economic Profit; CE =  Capital Employed; TMV =  Total Market Value - See section 4) 
Industo: Name  EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Aerospace & Defence  14  14  11 
Cars & Trucks  5  5  4 
Car Parts & Equipment  13  13  10 
Chemicals  24  24  23 
Plastics and Products  4  4  3 
Apparel  9  9  6 
Appliances & Home Furnishing  15  15  12 
Beverages  8  8  8 
Personal Care  9  9  7 
Tobacco  4  4  4 
Paper & Products  20  20  20 
Discount Retailing  14  14  11 
Fashion Retailing  11  11  8 
Electrical Products  6  6  6 
Electronics  9  9  5 
Instruments  7  7  7 
Semiconductors & Components  20  20  18 
Food Processing  24  24  20 
Food Distribution  3  3 
Food Retailing  9  9  9 
Oil & Gas  30  30  26 
Petroleum Services  12  12  10 
Drugs & Research  23  23  21 
Drug Distribution  8  8  8 
Medical Products  15  15  11 
Healthcare Services  7  7  5 
Building Materials  11  11  10 
Construction & Engineering  3  3 
Eating Places  6  6  6 
Entertainment  7  7  7 
Hotel & Motel  5  5 
Games & Toys  4  4 
General Engineering  21  21  7 
Machine & Hand Tools  5  5  5 
Machinery  6  6 
Packaging  3  3  3 
Textiles  3  3  3 
Aluminium  5  5 
Steel  9  9  9 
Metals  7  7 
Business Machine & Services  8  8  7 
Computers & Peripherals  24  24  19 
Computer Software & Services  15  15  14 
IT Consulting Services  8  8  6 
Broadcasting & Publishing  19  19  16 
Printing & Advertising  5  5  4 
Industrial Distribution  7  7  4 
Pollution Control  3  3 
Personnel Supply Services  3  3 
Telephone Equipment & Services  6  6  5 
Telephone Companies  16  16  16 
Cable Television  6  6  5 
Airlines  9  9  8 
Railroads  5  5  5 
Transilortation Services  10  10  9 
Total  562  562  441 
30 Table 3 
Mean EP/CE, TMV/CE and ROA by industry for the period 1987-1996 
(EP =  Economic Profit; CE =  Capital Employed; TMV =  Total Market Value - See section 4) 
Industry Name  EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Aerospace & Defence  -0.0331  1.3982  4.8390 
Cars & Trucks  -0.0150  0.9473  2.1660 
Car Parts & Equipment  -0.0003  1.5767  4.5989 
Chemicals  0.0029  1.8195  7.9589 
Plastics & Products  -0.0261  1.8394  5.3089 
Apparel  0.0106  2.0114  10.6866 
Appliances & Home Furnishing  -0.0191  1.5416  5.8016 
Beverages  0.0018  2.1688  5.5960 
Personal Care  0.0281  2.8700  8.005 
Tobacco  0.0936  3.2314  14.3979 
Paper & Products  -0.0149  1.2902  5.2342 
Discount Retailing  -0.0126  1.7803  6.3501 
Fashion Retailing  -0.0039  1.9829  9.2833 
Electrical Products  -0.0327  1.3056  4.6276 
Electronics  -0.0921  1.6542  3.4505 
Instruments  -0.0415  1.5443  5.1271 
Semiconductors & Components  -0.0126  2.0560  5.9906 
Food Processing.  0.0251  1.7090  8.5306 
Food Distribution  -0.0056  2.3515  -
Food Retailing  0.0248  1.9880  6.5234 
Oil & Gas  -0.0461  1.3604  2.5455 
Petroleum Services  -0.0980  1.7189  -0.5861 
Drugs & Research  0.0065  3.3807  7.6439 
Drug Distribution  -0.0067  1.6614  5.5325 
Medical Products  0.0276  3.0987  9.5384 
Healthcare Services  -0.0169  2.4681  3.2672 
Building Materials  -0.0056  ·1.5521  5.6250 
Construction & Engineering  -0.0458  1.6749  -
Eating Places  0.0014  2.3246  6.8867 
Entertainment  0.0442  2.8240  8.4403 
Hotel & Motel  -0.0362  0.5391  -
Games & Toys  0.0083  2.3755  -
General Engineering  -0.0303  1.7353  5.1617 
Machine & Hand Tools  -0.0174  1.4356  6.0154 
Machinery  -0.0406  1.0974  -
Packaging  0.0075  1.7197  4.9736 
Textiles  -0.0012  1.9392  7.4093 
Aluminium  -0.0128  1.4844  -
Steel  -0.0647  1.2967  2.2646 
Metals  -0.0101  1.7447  -
Business Machine & Services  0.0149  2.0492  8.2812 
Computers & Peripherals  -0.0306  1.7332  3.1143 
Computer Software & Services  0.0590  4.0331  10.3530 
IT Consulting Services  0.0206  2.7136  6.5260 
Broadcasting & Publishing  -0.0149  1.8042  6.0059 
Printing & Advertising  -0.0196  1.5565  2.3386 
Industrial Distribution  0.0012  2.5401  5.3783 
Pollution Control  -0.0140  1.7691  -
Personnel-Supply Services  0.0402  2.8095  -
Telephone Eguipment & Services  -0.0206  2.0647  7.0432 
Telephone Companies  -0.0124  1.3680  4.6181 
Cable Television  -0.0720  1.6966  -3.2513 
Airlines  -0.0416  1.1676  0.9866 
Railroads  -0.0340  1.0257  3.7780 
TransjJortation Services  -0.0195  1.5836  3.1847 
Mean  -0.0110  1.8930  5.5989 
Standard deviation  0.0335  0.6550  3.0364 
31 Table 6 
Absolute values of the variance contributed by independent variables for years 1986-1997 
(EP =  Economic Profit; CE = Capital Employed; TMV = Total Market Value - See section 4) 
Variance Component  Variance Estimate for Variable 
EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Firm  0.002650  1.095386  20.643661 
Industry  0.000633  0.382606  4.700882 
Year  0.000184  0.043188  0.555360 
Industry-Year  0.000411  0.097929  1.810961 
Error  0.005916  1.751753  30.036681 
Table 7 
Firm and industry effects in percentage of total variance of the dependent variable 
for years 1986-1997 based on the data reported in Table 6 
(EP = Economic Profit; CE = Capital Employed; TMV = Total Market Value - See section 4) 
Variance Component  EP/CE  TMVlCE  ROA 
Firm effect  27.1 %  32.5%  35.8 % 
Industry effect  6.5%  11.4%  8.1 % 
Year effect  1.9 %  1.3%  1.0% 
Industry-Year effect  4.2%  2.9%  3.1 % 
Error  60.3 %  51.9 %  52.0% 
TableS 
Comparison of results in percentage of total variance of the dependent variable 
(EP = Economic Profit; CE = Capital Employed; TMV = Total Market Value - See section 4) 
Variance  Schmalensee  Rumelt*  McGahan &  This study (see Table 7) 
Component  (1985)  (1991)  Porter (1997)  EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Firm effect  0.6%  44.2%  31.7 %  27.1 %  32.5%  35.8% 
Industry effect  19.6%  4.0%  18.7 %  6.5 %  11.4 %  8.1  % 
Year effect  N/A  N/A  2.4%  1.9 %  1.3 %  1.0 % 
Industry-Year  N/A  5.4%  N/A  4.2%  2.9%  3.1 % 
Corporate effect  N/A  1.6 %  4.3 %  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Error  80.4%  44.8 %  48.4%  60.3 %  51.9 %  52.0% 
*Only the results of sample B ofRumelt s (1991) study are reproduced here. 
32 Table 9 
Absolute values of the variance contributed by the independent variables 
for the modified* sample for years 1986-1997 
(EP =  Economic Profit; CE =  Capital Employed; TMV =  Total Market Value - See section 4) 
Variance Component  Variance Estimate for Variable 
EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Firm effect  0.000820  0.232559  5.697587 
Industry effect  0.000578  0.412727  5.413565 
Year effect  0.000148  0.033736  0.384852 
Industry-Year effect  0.000271  0.067775  1.409289 
Error  0.002839  0.619511  21.149261 
'The modified sample is smaller than the full  sample and excludes each industry'S top two leaders and bottom two losers 
according to the performance measure used (EP/CE, TMV  ICE and ROA).  See section 7 in text for details. 
Table 10 
Firm and industry effects for the modified* and full samples 
in percentage of total variance for years 1986-1997, based on Tables 9 and 7 
(EP =  Economic Profit; CE =  Capital Employed; TMV =  Total Market Value - See section 4) 
Variance  EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Component  Modified*  Full  Modified*  Full  Modified*  FuB 
Firm effect  17.6%  27.1 %  17.0%  32.5 %  16.7 %  35.8 % 
Industry effect  12.4 %  6.5 %  30.2%  11.4 %  16.0 %  8.1  % 
Year effect  3.2%  1.9 %  2.5 %  1.3%  1.1%  1.0 % 
Industry-Year effect  5.8%  4.2%  5.0%  2.9%  4.1 %  3.1  % 
Error  61.0 %  60.3 %  45.3 %  51.9 %  62.1 %  52.0% 
'The modified  sample  is  smaller than  the  full  sample  and  excludes each  industry's top  two  leaders and  bottom  two  losers 
according to the performance measure used (EP/CE, TMV/CE and ROA).  See section 7 in text for details, 
33 Table 11 
Firm and industry effects in percentage of total variance of the dependent variable 
for years 1987-1996 (number of outlying industries removed - 3 leaders and 3 losers for 
EP/CE and TMV/CE; 2 leaders and 2 losers for ROA) 
Variance Com-,,-onent  EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Firm effect  28.0%  38.3 %  34.0% 
Industry effect  4.8 %  4.3 %  8.6% 
Year effect  2.5 %  1.2%  1.5 % 
Industry-Year effect  4.0%  2.3 %  2.4% 
Error  60.7%  53.9 %  53.5 % 
Table 12 
Firm and industry effects in percentage of total variance of the dependent variable 
for years 1987-1996 (number of outlying industries removed - 4 leaders and 4 losers for 
EP/CE and TMV/CE; 3 leaders and 3 losers for ROA) 
Variance Component  EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Firm effect  27.2%  36.8 %  33.9% 
Indus~  effect  4.1 %  4.4%  7.5% 
Year effect  2.5 %  1.2 %  1.5 % 
Industry-Year effect  3.9%  2.5 %  2.7% 
Error  62.3 %  55.1 %  54.4% 
Table 13 
Firm and industry effects in percentage of total variance of the dependent variable 
for years 1987-1996 (number of outlying industries removed - 5 leaders and 5 losers for 
EP/CE and TMV/CE; 4 leaders and 4 losers for ROA) 
Variance Component  EP/CE  TMV/CE  ROA 
Firm effect  26.8%  37.9 %  32.8 % 
Industry effect  3.9%  2.5%  6.9% 
Year effect  2.5%  1.4 %  1.4% 
Industry-Year effect  3.9%  1.1%  2.7% 
Error  62.8 %  57.1 %  56.2% 
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